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ABSTRACT 
Galileo, Europe’s global navigation satellite system, 
represents a major public infrastructure offering 
numerous advantages for civilian users worldwide. The 
public dimension combined with the significant growth 
of the satellite navigation markets prompted the 
European Union to choose a Public-Private Partnership 
(PPP) scheme for the deployment and operational phases 
of the Galileo program. After a short introduction on the 
fundamentals of PPP schemes, both Galileo and Skynet 5 
programs are compared to other large scale PPP projects, 
mainly in the transport sector. It clearly appears that a 
strong cooperation between the public sector and 
industry is needed for PPPs in the space sector. The 
present work attempts to provide a view of the Galileo 
PPP from an industrial perspective and to discuss the 
main critical issues of its implementation: risk allocation, 
finance, regulatory framework and other related issues. 
Technical and business complexity is the key driver 
which determines financial aspects and risk allocation. 
Therefore PPPs in the space sector show unique features 
in comparison with other sectors. 
If PPPs appear to be a complicated procurement scheme 
to their detractors, experience shows that behind the 
acronym lies a concrete collaborative work which 
demonstrates how the public sector and industry (private) 
can together achieve both market and policy success. The 
Galileo and Skynet 5 programs do - and will - face issues 
in many areas. No doubt they also provide positive 
experiences to be transferred to future space projects and 
the increasing popularity of PPPs as innovative financing 
schemes. 
INTRODUCTION  
Galileo is the European Global Navigation Satellite 
System (GNSS) which will be interoperable with the 
current US Global Positioning System (GPS). Unlike 
GPS, which is a military system, Galileo was designed 
primarily for civil purposes. The deployment and 
operation of the Galileo system will be managed by 
establishing a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) between 
industry and the Galileo Supervisory Authority (GSA) 
within the framework of a concession contract. 
After a short introduction on the principles of PPP 
schemes, the present paper attempts to analyze their 
actual implementation in both transport and space sectors 
with respect to technical and business model complexity 
and the consequences thereof. In particular, this allows a 
fair comparison between already established PPP 
projects and Galileo, in order to highlight the 
specificities of space related PPPs and the associated 
challenges faced in implementing PPP schemes in the 
future. 
OVERVIEW OF PPP MODELS 
Definition 
Although there is no widely accepted definition of 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), these schemes are 
usually described as partnerships between the public 
sector and the private sector (industry), for the purpose of 
delivering a project or a service traditionally provided by 
the public sector. 
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PPPs come in a variety of different forms ranging from 
full public responsibility (e.g. in-house public 
procurement) to full private responsibility (e.g. 
privatization). Figure 1 provides a classification of five 
common PPP structures with respect to responsibility 
transfer between the public and the private sector. 
In general PPPs are characterized by the following 
generic phases after contract signature until termination: 
financing, design finalization, construction, operation 
and services provision. The sequence and nature of the 
phases may vary substantially from one PPP to another, 




























































Figure 1: PPP Types and Responsibility Transfer 
The public sector not only contracts for infrastructure 
development and deployment, but also for management 
and operations where risks are shared between the public 
and the private sector. In particular, some of these 
structures are characterized by the involvement of private 
finance, mainly through the establishment of Special 
Purpose Companies (SPCs). In Europe, the UK has been 
extensively developing such partnerships through so-
called Private Finance Initiatives (PFI) (see DBFM and 
DBFO structures), a special category of PPP schemes. 
PPPs can generate substantial benefits for customers and 
taxpayers. However, the scope of potential benefits will 
depend on the type of project being undertaken and the 
exact terms of the contract governing the PPP. In the end 
Value for Money (VfM) will only be achieved through 
the exploitation of private sector competencies, 
combined with an appropriate allocation of 
responsibilities between the public customer and the 
private contractor. 
Value for Money 
In order to properly assess whether a PPP is Value for 
Money (VfM) compared to a traditional procurement, a 
Public Sector Comparator (PSC) is prepared to provide a 
basis for judging the attractiveness of PPP schemes. This 
is a hypothetical risk-adjusted costing by the public 
sector taking into account the total life-cycle costs of the 
project. 
To be a valid benchmark against which private sector 
bids can be compared, the PSC must reflect not only base 
costs (i.e. most likely cost out-turn) but also the 
additional costs that may arise if risks such as delays and 
cost escalation materialize. Therefore the PSC must be 
adjusted with risks classified into two categories from a 
customer point of view [1]: 
• Retained Risks, which must by definition be the same 
within PSC and PPP; 
• Transferred Risks, which are included in the service 
payments but need to be taken into account in the PSC, 
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Figure 2: Net Present Value of PSC vs. PPP 
Historically evidence suggests that public sector 
procurement tends to base budgets on low cost and early 
completion rather than the most likely outcome. This is 
arguably exacerbated, because public procurers have less 
incentive to manage risks effectively. Consequently, risk 
transfer comes out on top as the primary driver of VfM. 
In essence, the VfM of a project is improved each time a 
risk is transferred to the private sector for which the 
private sector is in a better position to manage that risk 
on behalf of the public sector. This is particularly the 
case when the overall risk transfer package is coherent. 
Each risk which is transferred to the private sector, where 
the private sector is either unable or is not better 
positioned to manage that risk than the public sector, will 
reduce the VfM of the PPP project. Managing in most 
cases also implies having a certain level of control over 
the risk, even though many risks are not a 100% 
controlled by either party. For those risks where neither 
party is best to manage, evidence shows that new 
innovative solutions are found to deal with the risk as a 
consequence of a common interest to mitigate or control 
that risk for the success of the project.  
Financial Structure 
The effective allocation of risk has a direct impact on the 
financial structure of the project, especially under a PPP 
deal where risk allocation is critical for the success of the 
project. The degree of risk transfer to the private sector 
will indeed influence the overall cost of the project to the 
public sector, as all risk will be associated with a price 
premium. PPPs are therefore often characterized by a 
more complicated financial engineering in the sourcing 
and combination of different financing types and allow 
for an efficient and innovative financial plan to realize 
large public projects. 
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In practice, sponsors will typically form a Special 
Purpose Company (SPC, see Figure 3) whose sole 
purpose is to own and operate the business and being 
clearly accountable for project delivery with a high level 
of management autonomy. 
Public Ownerli  r
SPC SponsorsLendersr




Figure 3: Typical PPP Structure 
The debt/equity gearing does not simply depend on the 
costs of financing, but rather on the risks inherent to the 
project. Typically, since equity is rather more expensive 
than debt, PPP financial structures are highly leveraged, 
with gearing ratios ranging from 80:20 to 90:10. The 
gearing is driven by the risks, which themselves are 
driven by the complexity of the project, both technically 
and commercially. 
Service Payment Mechanism 
The involvement of private funding in public projects is 
of primary interest to increase the effectiveness. In effect, 
PPP schemes allow the public sector to cope with lack of 
immediate funds by translating up-front capital into a 
flow of on-going service payments and potential grants, 














Figure 4: Generic Service Payments 
The design of an appropriate payment mechanism is 
critical, as it gives financial effect to the risk allocation. 
Clearly, a tension exists between the public sector's wish 
to pay only for the services it consumes and the private 
sector's obligations to repay its debt to lenders, regardless 
of the level of use. As a result, there are two typical 
payment mechanisms designed for PPP projects: 
• Availability Payment, where the contractor receives 
payments with respect to the availability of the service 
provided regardless of the level of use; 
• Volume Payment, where the customer only pays for 
the utilization of the service provided by the 
contractor. 
In practice, payment mechanisms are rather designed as a 
mix of these two concepts, so as to guarantee minimum 
payments to the contractor and to ensure vital incentives 
to perform. In addition, some PPPs allow – or oblige – 
the contractor to generate additional revenues from third 
parties or from the mass market. A revenue sharing 
mechanism may be then implemented. 
Overall, PPPs can be considered to be more effective 
tools to finance and run projects for the public sector, 
primarily due to the appropriate allocation of risk. The 
potential for third party revenues also reduces the costs 
of the project for the original customer. 
PPP IMPLEMENTATION IN LARGE PROJECTS 
Introduction 
PPPs in the Transport Sector 
In Europe, the beginning of PPP can be traced back to 
the early 1990’s, when PPPs were essentially applied in 
the UK under so-called PFI schemes. Since then, PPPs 
have been markedly widespread in other European 
countries, especially in the transport and construction 
sectors. 
The study of sizeable programs in the transport sector, 
which have both strong technical and commercial 
approaches, provides interesting findings to compare 
with Galileo and Skynet 5. As a matter of example; the 
following PPPs have been analyzed: 
• The Channel Tunnel Rail Link (UK, 1996) a 90-year 
DBFO concession to realize a high speed rail link 
between the Channel Tunnel and London [2]; 
• The IP5 Shadow Toll Road (Portugal, 2001), a 30-year 
DBFO concession to realize a highway link between 
Portuguese west coast and Spain [3]; 
• NATS Ltd. (UK, 2001), a public-private joint venture 
to develop the national air traffic services company [4]; 
• The High Speed Line Zuid (The Netherlands, 2001), a 
30-year DBFM concession to realize a high speed rail 
link between Amsterdam and Antwerp [5]; 
• London Underground Ltd. (UK, 2003), three 30-year 
DBFM concessions to maintain and upgrade the 
London underground [6]. 
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• Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft (UK, 2005 in 
progress), a 27-year UK MoD PFI contract to provide 
air refueling and air transport services to the Royal Air 
Force. 
 
PPPs in the Space Sector 
PPPs have also reached some more strategic sectors such 
as defense and space, mostly following UK MoD 
initiatives. To date, two projects can be mentioned, the 
first one being the sole PPP/PFI ever contractually closed 
in the space sector: 
• the Skynet 5 project (UK, 2003), and 
• the Galileo concession (EU, currently in procurement). 
In 1997, the British government conceived a military 
satellite communications system that would replace the 
MoD’s current Skynet 4 satellites. The MoD chose the 
PPP route for the satellites because it believed that it 
would save the UK government £500m (c. €740m) over 
the life-time of the contract [7]. 
Under the 15-year DBFO concession contract, Paradigm 
Secure Communications Ltd (a 100% subsidiary of 
EADS SPACE Services) will deliver core military 
satellite communications to the UK armed forces, with 
the ability to commercialize spare capacity to third 
parties. This involves taking over the ownership and 
operation of the existing Skynet 4 infrastructure and 
incorporating two new Skynet 5 satellites and the 
associated ground segment refurbishments from 2005 
onwards, with the full service available by 2008. 
In 1998, the European Commission decided to 
investigate the development of a European Global 
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), in coordination 
with the European Space Agency. In order to best meet 
the public sector’s objectives whilst attracting private 
investment, a 20-year PPP scheme has been selected for 
the deployment and operation of Galileo. 
A major specificity of the Galileo program is the 
staggered approach which has been used. The public 
sector (EC, ESA) will be responsible for the Definition 
and Development & In-Orbit Validation (IOV) phases. 
These cover the detailed definition and the deployment 
of a minimal terrestrial infrastructure, as well as the 
launch and testing of 4 satellites. Then, the Deployment 
and Operation phases will be managed under a PPP with 
a private Galileo concessionaire. The concessionaire will 
complete the 30-satellite constellation, the related ground 
segment and provide the users with the five Galileo 
services. The Operation phase will require the 
maintenance of the system and thus replenishment of the 
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Figure 5: Galileo Program Phases 
Analysis of PPP Projects 
Selection of the Procurement Model 
The procurement of a service under a PPP offers a wide 
range of possibilities to public entities that do not have 
the skills to run some particular projects or/and have 
budget constraints. In particular, a crucial skill is risk 
management. Analyzing PPPs in other sectors clearly 
shows that the complexity is a key differentiator since it 
reflects the risks inherent to the project: 
• Technical, as a function of experience in similar 
projects, technology innovation, diversity of 
technology embarked, interdependency of project’s 
phases and tasks, and external constraints; 
• Business, as a function of competition, risk of 
substitution, service innovation, potential for 
regulatory support, market volatility and commercial 
viability. 
Figure 6 displays several sectors where PPPs have been 




















































































































Figure 6: PPP Projects' Complexity Mapping 
Since road and rail transport projects can rely on 
significant experience in designing and building such 
infrastructures, these projects are rather business driven, 
although the road market has a fair level of certainty. The 
air transport sector (NATS) seems more challenging 
commercially, .since this sector is far more sensitive to 
market events. Traditionally, the opposite would apply to 
governmental markets, especially in the case of military 
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projects, where the technology is often the critical part of 
a project. However, the introduction of PPP schemes in 
these markets has triggered a more business-oriented 
approach therein, with Skynet5 and FSTA as an example. 
By comparison, Galileo stands out as a global challenge 
with absolutely no experience to drawn upon. As a dual-
use system serving both governmental and mass market 
applications, Galileo is on top the first PPP ever to be 
undertaken at EU level. In this case, the rationale for the 
selection of a PPP scheme was driven by the wish to 
optimize the procurement efficiency, to minimize public 
sector’s exposure to risks and to reduce total life-cycle 
costs by benefiting from private sector’s management 
skills. The involvement of private finance and the 
optimization of market revenue generation shall, as a 
matter of fact, help to reduce the need for public 
contribution over the 20-year concession period. The 
dual challenge of Galileo both technically and 
commercially raises the crucial issue of allocation of 
responsibilities. 
Allocation of Responsibilities 
The actual organization and allocation of tasks (Design, 
Build, Finance, Maintain, Operate etc.) in PPPs offers 
interesting findings. Usually, the complexity of the 
project, in addition to the actual partners’ interests, drives 
the allocation of responsibilities. Firstly, because there 
may not be an ideal private partner that is able to bear the 
risks it was expected to bear. Secondly, since the public 
sector may have to keep operations under its control, e.g. 
for safety reasons, e.g. in the transport sector. 
The transfer of responsibility for operations and the 
potential split between operations, maintenance and pure 
service provision appears relevant in some particular 
cases. In the Dutch HSL Zuid project, the PPP only 
covers construction and maintenance activities. 
Operations are performed separately under an exclusive 
license agreement with the public authority outside the 
scope of the PPP. This may be an efficient way to share 
risks and therefore to mitigate their impact on all 
stakeholders. However, this also suggests a significant 
amount of responsibilities retained by the public sector, 
with respect to its liabilities towards the operations 
company. 
Here, Galileo differs from typical DBFO structures 
because of the staggered approach which has been used. 
Indeed, the public sector is responsible for the design of 
the system, as well as its development. The private 
concessionaire will only take charge after the so-called 
IOV readiness review, to complete the full deployment 
of the system. Figure 7 presents the proposed structure of 
the Galileo concession. 
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Figure 7: Galileo PPP Structure 
The concessionaire’s responsibilities are therefore 
composed of securing private finance, sub-contracting 
for the deployment and launch services, operating and 
maintaining the system as well as integrating European 
Geostationary Navigation Overlay System (EGNOS). 
This allocation of responsibilities, while avoiding 
conflicts of interests, has however significant impacts on 
risk allocation, which is discussed further on. 
Financial Set-Up 
The analysis of gearing ratios with respect to project’s 
complexity reveals that high complexity projects have a 
lower gearing ratio, which is expected. Although 
complexity is rather a subjective parameter, PPPs are 
usually characterized by high gearing ratios for projects 
with limited complexity, and low gearing for very 
complex projects. Either because of the difficulty to 
secure high levels of debt for risky projects, or due to the 
potential cost increases right after the senior debt is 
secured and then covered by an increased amount of 
equity, as can be shown by two PPPs which were 
restructured (e.g. NATS and CTRL). Figure 8 displays 
the gearing ratio of some major PPPs versus the 
complexity of the projects [8]. In this diagram, (*) stands 

































Figure 8: Gearing Ratio vs. Complexity 
In the different cases studied, highly geared structures 
seem to be more vulnerable and some PPP deals were 
restructured after adverse events appeared. Clearly, there 
is a balance between the need to build a robust financial 
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structure on the one hand, and private partners’ wish to 
minimize equity investment in order to reduce their 
exposure. The separation of operational activities, as 
used in the Dutch HSL project, may allow a high gearing 
while building a robust project structure. This is 
essentially characterized by allocating the market risk to 
a third party, namely the train operator, under an 
exclusive license agreement outside the scope of the 
PPP. 
Concerning Galileo, the target 90:10 gearing ratio 
appears relatively ambitious with respect to the overall 
project’s complexity, by comparison to other PPPs. 
Experience shows that such a high gearing mark will 
only be achieved with a reasonable risk sharing. The 
degree of risk transfer to the private concessionaire shall 
not only be acceptable to the private sponsors, but also to 
the senior lenders. In addition, the set up of the financial 
structure of a PPP/PFI is driven by the market risk 
allocation of the project. In the case of Galileo, this is 
particularly important given the specificities of the 
satellite navigation market and will depend highly upon 
the public and private sectors to cooperate on revenue 
generating mechanisms to reduce commercial risks. 
Typical Risk Allocation 
The guiding principle for PPP risks allocation is that a 
risk shall be allocated to the party best able to manage it 
(or control it). Whereas the level of risk transfer to the 
private sector will vary depending on the project type, 
there is a typical risk allocation which is common to 
most PPPs. In practice, this shall be adjusted throughout 
the bidding process as well as iterated during the 
negotiation phase. According to some PPPs which have 
been implemented so far, a typical risk allocation for a 
PPP concession contract can be indicated, as proposed in 
the following [9]: 
• Design, Development & Construction Risks: Private 
- The private sector is usually required to bear the risk 
of cost and time overruns. Contracting Authority 
however retains risk of changes to output 
specifications. 
• Operational & Maintenance Risks: Private - The 
customer only provides output-based specifications, 
and the contractor is penalized when failing to meet 
service requirements. 
• Planning Risk: Shared - It may be retained by the 
contracting authority for pilot projects. However, there 
may be occasions when transfer in whole or part is 
appropriate or unavoidable. 
• Performance Risks: Private- This is where the 
availability payment mechanism is established to 
mitigate the performance risk. 
• Market Risk: Shared - This risk is only shared or 
transferred when a reasonable certainty can be 
achieved in revenue forecasts with little or no 
dependency on public support (through regulations, 
etc…) 
• Policy & Legislative Risk: Public - Public authorities 
are best placed to control regulatory and legislative 
risks, which can be critical in international projects 
such as Galileo. 
• Residual Value Risk: Shared - This risk is strongly 
dependent on the duration of the contract and the 
nature of the assets. 
• Inflation & Other Financial Risks: Private - This risk 
is often transferred to the contractor with possible use 
of indexation mechanisms. 
However, the specificities of space programs do not 
allow such a typical risk allocation to be applied. This is 
due to the fact, that design, deployment (including 
launches), operations and maintenance of assets 
(especially space assets), market and residual value risks 
are more critical than in any other sector. 
Space Program Management 
As the space domain is objectively driven by institutional 
initiatives, programmatic issues present significant 
differences compared to other sectors. This suggests the 
need for a true partnership between the private 
concessionaire and the public customer, in this case the 
Galileo Joint Undertaking (GJU), composed of both EC 
and ESA staff. Nevertheless, Galileo also constitutes the 
first ever PPP undertaken at EU level, which further 
implies interaction with all EU and ESA Member States. 
Together with the political context inherent to space 
programs, the complex interfaces of a PPP add a new 
complexity layer which makes Galileo a unique program. 
Space System Design 
In the case of Galileo, the concession tendering process 
managed by the GJU has been conducted in parallel to 
the publicly funded design, development and validation 
phase under ESA management. After this so-called IOV 
phase, the public sector will transfer responsibility for 
the full deployment and operation phases to the 
concessionaire, who will interact with the GSA, the 
successor of the GJU. 
This staggered approach has considerable effects on the 
implementation of the PPP, in particular for the 
negotiation phase since some risks associated with public 
specifications will be transferred onto the contractor for 
the operation phase. As a result, the risk allocation will 
significantly impact the establishment of an appropriate 
financial structure. A close cooperation between the 
private concessionaire and the public sector will 
therefore be a critical factor to the success of the Galileo 
PPP, more than for any other PPP. In the Skynet 5 case 
this was different, as the contractor took over an existing 
and operational system. The Skynet 5 satellites will of 
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course apply new technologies and capabilities, but the 
project can heavily rely on past technical experience. 
Whereas in Galileo, EGNOS was conceived to give 
European industry a first experience in navigation 
systems based on satellites, crucial technologies 
necessary for Galileo are not part of the EGNOS 
program. The technology “jump” needs to be carefully 
analyzed and factored into the risk allocation profile. 
Space System Deployment 
The construction phase is generally an activity the 
private contractor masters quite well, especially in such 
sectors as transport and civil works where relevant 
experience exists. In the case of space projects though, it 
is necessary to distinguish between pure manufacturing 
and assembling activities and actual deployment of space 
assets, relying on launch services. Here, experience from 
former launches does not necessarily mitigate many of 
the related risks. To date, satellite services can present 
reliability figures greater than 98%. Still, a satellite 
launch remains a risky event in comparison with other 
sectors. Due to the criticality of a launch failure, for 
which the space asset(s) embarked can no longer be 
retrieved (total loss), the deployment of a space system is 
a critical phase. As a result, this has a significant impact 
on insurance costs and contingencies, likely to reach 
more than one fifth of the launch costs. 
In addition to the insurance costs, the impact on 
deployment planning is also significant. In the case of 
Galileo, a 30-satellite constellation, the launchers will 
carry several spacecraft at the same time – from two to 
six, depending on the launcher to be used. This is can be 
very efficient in terms of cost and schedule, but also 
constitutes a single critical point failure in the project 
planning. Procuring several new satellites, with the 
associated long-lead items, can significantly delay the 
deployment phase – hence the need for a careful 
assessment and modeling of events and associated risks. 
Risk management and insurance concepts are key in a 
space program, especially when deploying several 
spacecraft for a constellation. 
Space System Operations and Maintenance 
As with regards to operational and maintenance activities 
for space projects, the amount of risk that can be 
transferred is difficult to quantify. A space system is 
usually a bespoke piece of equipment that will need to be 
used under conditions of extreme security. Important 
parts, such as satellites, are normally out of the reach of 
any maintenance activity. This emphasizes the need for 
redundancy in the spacecraft components as well as spare 
spacecraft to ensure performance in case of failures and 
outages. Again, this has a direct impact on insurance 
costs and contingencies and the risk the concessionaire is 
taking. Observation of GPS history shows, that the 
ability of the concessionaire to operate his constellation 
efficiently under contractual key performance indicators 
will be an area of major importance, which he will need 
to develop to commercially succeed. Here special care 
has to be taken with the constellation replenishment 
strategy, which requires substantial investment and again 
an adequate risk allocation in the case of mission 
evolutions to the Galileo system. 
Satellite Service Provision 
In essence, it is clear that the rationale for PPP schemes 
is to benefit from the private sector’s skills, in particular 
in the commercialization of the services. However, 
demand risk is often something that the private sector 
cannot manage, because its crucial factors may be 
controlled by public decisions. Transferring the demand 
risk may therefore be bad VfM, as it involves pricing 
risks outside the control of the contractor. This is 
especially true, when the public side is a major customer 
himself. 
A brilliant example to this is the case of PFI prison 
contracts in the UK. Demand risk was not transferred in 
these PPPs, after the private sector successfully argued 
that the use of prisons was not a risk that they could 
manage cost effectively, because they had no control 
over sentencing policy. This resulted in re-tendering the 
contract with a new payment formula based on 
availability (i.e. percentage of usable rooms) and service 
performance (e.g. cleaning services) rather than volume 
(i.e. occupation rate) [10]. 
Concerning Galileo, the uncertainty of the business 
model which has no precedent (civil GPS services are for 
free) makes the market risk a critical factor. Whereas 
market development will be a private matter, a regulatory 
framework will be essential to enable the penetration of 
GNSS services in specific areas were a value relative to a 
basic service can be turned into a benefit for users. A 
current example to this is given by recent regulation 
concerning the need to locate accurately any emergency 
call in the US (E-911) [11] or in the EU (E-112) [12]. 
Other examples are road tolling or law enforcement 
applications. Following the example of the PFI prison 
contracts, this part of the market risk influences both risk 
allocation and the service payment mechanism. 
PPP Service Payment Mechanism 
The service payment mechanism is therefore critical to 
the success of a PPP since it links risk and responsibility 
transfer to the financial structure. 
There are several ways of mitigating market risk, 
depending on the sector. As far as road transport is 
concerned, so-called shadow toll regimes under which 
the contractor is paid by the public sector in relation with 
the number of users is a widespread scheme. Users 
actually don’t pay directly through real tolls; the costs 
are financed by taxpayers. Such schemes though have 
sometimes been considered “unfair” to end-users, as they 
do not link volume of use per end-user with the cost he 
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incurs, i.e. the tax payment. Recent discussions on the 
UK road user charging scheme highlight difficulties of 
such schemes [13] and the need for fair charging 
concepts, i.e. distance based schemes. Nevertheless 
shadow toll regimes are very simple to implement by the 
public side and can therefore be considered as very 
effective scheme. 
The Skynet 5 deal presents an innovative arrangement as 
a mix of both availability payments and volume 
payments, with ability to attract third party revenues. On 
the one hand, payments directly reflect the use of the 
services by the original customer (the UK MoD) with a 
minimum payment level that guarantees revenues. On the 
other hand, the contractor is given the right to sell the 
spare communication capacity, not used by the UK MoD, 
to third parties, hence allowing for additional revenues. 
This may turn into a very attractive business if the 
commercialization of third party revenues is successful 
and can above certain levels reduce the costs of the 
project for the original customer, the UK MoD. 
During the early years of the Galileo concession, the 
contractor will receive availability payments from the 
public sector so as to match with the revenues required to 
cover the entire costs of the project if the forecasted 
revenues materialize. At a defined point in time the 
market revenues should be sufficient to cover the costs 
and hence the availability payments are reduced to zero. 
However, the commercial aspect of Galileo has to be 
driven by a mechanism which allows for incentives for 
both the public and private sectors. Such schemes are 
addressed in general under revenue sharing mechanisms, 
but may also take other innovative forms. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The above analysis has highlighted some characteristics 
of representative large PPP projects in the transport and 
construction sectors and allowed a comparison with the 
space sector. This leads to a considerable number of 
differences inherent to the specificities of the space 
programs. The following figure maps some of these 
specificities against several criteria, relevant to the nature 














Figure 9: Comparison of Representative PPPs in 
Transport & Space Sectors 
Clearly, both technical and business aspects are key 
differentiators to the projects analyzed in the present 
paper. In particular, it goes without saying that Galileo is 
a very challenging project technically and commercially. 
It shows that, whereas the space sector has some very 
specific challenges compared to other sectors, the PPP 
schemes can be successfully adapted to answer the needs 
from public customers. This can only be achieved if 
some few common principles are respected in the frame 
of a true Public-Private Partnership. Figure 9 highlights 
the differences discovered in comparison with PPPs in 
other sectors. Technical complexity is considered high in 
space sector PPPs and relates to a lower debt/investment 
ratio, which reflects the gearing ratio. The technical 
complexity is not only driven by technology but also by 
the specifics in the construction phase, for example 
launch events. This is particularly true for space 
constellations. Overall investment volume for Skynet 5 
has been under the average PPP, but Galileo reaches the 
typical levels found in other sectors. Contract duration is 
also shorter than in most PPPs in other sectors, probably 
reflecting the system design lifetime, but this does not 
necessarily need to be the case as Galileo proves. 
Business complexity clearly is a differentiator in Galileo 
making it a dual challenge, i.e. both technically and 
commercially. Without doubt these specific differences 
have had or will require adapted PPP/PFI schemes and 
appropriate risk allocation profiles. 
Relevant Allocation of Responsibilities 
It is of primary importance to respect the actual interests 
of all stakeholders and not to seek a complete transfer of 
responsibilities to the same party. In particular, it may be 
relevant to limit the scope of the PPP to certain 
engineering activities, and treat more business oriented, 
such as operations and service provision, outside the 
scope of the PPP as examples in the transport sector 
show (HSL Zuid). 
As for the private sector to take responsibility of the 
program implementation, it is of major importance that 
the contractor has a “pilot in the seat” and preserves 
continuity of the program management through the 
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tender, negotiation and implementation phases despite 
their usually long duration (typically 3-6 years). PPP 
projects, especially in the space sector, require a range of 
competences not necessarily needed in traditional 
procurement approaches. Exemplary are: 
• Unique risk modeling, liability management and 
insurance expertise; 
• Business modeling capabilities and structured finance 
competences; 
• Legal and regulatory know-how (frequencies, 
licenses); 
• Procurement and subcontracting management skills for 
technically bespoke complex systems. 
The use of advisors may substitute for competences 
which are not existing internally, nevertheless experience 
shows that a “pilot in the seat” covering all key aspects is 
the best solution and it is in the interest of the sponsors to 
sufficiently master and control above mentioned aspects. 
Optimization of Risk Transfer 
The overall principle of allocating a risk to the party best 
able to manage it shall be respected, as it constitutes a 
critical success factor to the implementation of PPPs. It is 
a fundamental principle governing all PPPs regardless of 
the sector. As far as the space sector is concerned, the 
present analysis has highlighted the specificities of such 
projects and the inherent competencies required 
throughout the various phases of the projects. Even 
though the “standard” allocation may not change, new 
skills may be required in the private sector to manage the 
risk. For Galileo therefore, market risk allocation will 
certainly be an area of detailed discussion between the 
public and private sectors, as well as the technical design 
risk. 
Joint Commitment to Develop the Program 
Commitment is especially important when the public 
sector has a strong influence on the development of 
markets, for instance through regulatory initiatives. The 
nature of the satellite navigation market makes Galileo a 
real business challenge, and requires the interaction with 
public institutions with respect to the regulatory 
environment, certification and standardization issues, as 
well as international cooperation and other issues which 
may have an impact on the revenue generating capability 
of the concessionaire. 
Development of a Relevant Framework 
The successful implementation of PPPs also requires a 
suitable framework to be developed. As an example, the 
current European space ambition faces budget constraints 
which can be resolved, or at least minimized, by two 
solutions. The first one is by using innovative financing 
schemes (PPP) in order to avoid significant up-front 
budget requirements. The second one requires the 
harmonization of national requirements across the EU, so 
as to coordinate and implement common projects. If 
using PPPs is increasingly being considered across 
Europe, EU Member States definitely need to coordinate 
their actions to actually get the benefits from what PPPs 
can provide for internationals projects. The same applies 
of course outside of Europe. Suitable legal and 
procedural frameworks can determine the success of a 
PPP. 
CONCLUSION 
The spread of Public-Private Partnerships beyond the 
traditional sectors transport and construction into more 
strategic sectors such as the space sector has opened a 
new way of thinking. In particular, the implementation of 
PPP schemes within the space sector, initiated by the 
EADS SPACE Services led Skynet 5 project, and 
furthermore with the on-going Galileo program, paves 
the way for further future projects. Beyond the 
possibilities offered by PPPs, those schemes have above 
all brought innovative tools to help the public customers 
realize projects of public interest. PPP projects are a way 
to provide a win-win situation for both the public and the 
private sectors, if the specific differences which exist in 
Space programs are taken into account. The specific 
differences are driven by the business and/or technical 
complexity of the programs as shown. This has an impact 
on the financial structure of the project and the allocation 
of responsibilities and risks. 
Nevertheless, not all countries have the necessary legal 
and procedural frameworks to realize PPP projects. Even 
though the number of projects which can be developed 
and implemented by the public and private sectors is 
finite, the current number of space PPPs is limited in 
comparison with other areas. The EC has already started 
working on this issue with the private community in 
publishing a Green Paper on PPPs [14]. The results will 
hopefully set up the basis to harmonize a concept at 
European level and help the appropriate environment to 
be further developed. This will at least provide a basis on 
which new space projects of public interest may be 
launched despite budget constraints. 
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